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The term "dollarization" will be interpreted in this paper as the degree
to which real and financial transactions are actually performed in dollars
relative to those performed in domestic currency. Since this is an un-
observable variable, an obvious choice for measuring the extent of dollar-
ization in the economy is the proportion of dollars to domestic currency
circulating at any time.
This concept of dollarization is closely related to the literature on
"currency substitution." This literature explains the conditions under
which diversified portfolios of domestic and foreign money balances will
be held and adapted in response to expected changes in relative risks and
returns among the various currencies. The general idea of several recent
papers (Miles 1978; Brillenbourg and Schadler 1980; Girton and Roper
1981) is that monetary policy will be ineffective in a country where
foreign currencies are regarded as good substitutes for domestic cur-
rency. An important implication of this hypothesis is that the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign currency is likely to increase in
periods when the exchange rate is floating and, consequently, the per-
ceived risks of changes in the value of domestic currency are greater. This
implies, of course, that the ability of the monetary authorities to pursue
independent monetary policies is severely restricted—even in a world of
floating rates. Hence, if the issue of currency substitution turns out to be
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empirically relevant, one of the stronger arguments for floating rates—
greater national monetary independence—is seriously weakened.
The relevance of the dollarization problem for Mexico and other Latin
American countries is not so much related to fixed versus floating ex-
change rates—since most countries in the area are not feasible floaters
anyway—but to the potential problems of short-run monetary instability
that currency substitution can create. If the demand for domestic cur-
rency is strongly influenced by "foreign" variables, a substantial degree
of instability may be imported from abroad (from volatile interest rates,
for example) even if the monetary authorities follow consistent monetary
and exchange rate policies.
A fluctuating foreign-domestic composition of bank deposits is likely to
be reflected on the asset side of the portfolios of financial institutions and,
consequently, on the availability of the credit in domestic currency ex-
tended to firms and individuals. Also, in the absence of adequate protec-
tion mechanisms, firms may be reluctant to accept foreign currency
denominated loans (or may engage in speculative inventory activities if
highly leveraged in foreign currency). These effects may be more impor-
tant if dollarization extends to time and savings deposits, especially in
countries, such as Mexico, where the banking system provides most of
the external financing to firms.
This paper focuses mainly on the dollarization of demand deposits,
since most of the discussion on the effects of currency substitution has
been concerned with narrow definitions of money. Section 4.2 contains a
historical account of the dollarization process from 1933 to date. In
section 4.3 an attempt is made to explain and quantify the main forces
determining the behavior of the dollar/peso deposit ratio. Section 4.4
deals with the problem of monetary instability caused by currency substi-
tution, and section 4.5 is a brief summary of the results and conclusions.
4.2 Dollarization: A Historical Perspective
The earliest regulations on exchange rate policy and monetary control
in Mexico were implemented during the long (and politically stable)
administration of General Porfirio Diaz. The Comision de Cambios y
Moneda (Council on Money and Exchange Rate) was created in 1905
with the intention of administering a fund of "monetary regulation" that
would control the flows of gold, foreign exchange, and trade credit
resulting from international transactions. The circulation of foreign cur-
rency in Mexico was explicitly prohibited by the Comision; this consti-
tutes one of the first—and last—attempts at establishing any form of
exchange controls in Mexico.
The incipient financial system of General Diaz was completely disman-
tled by the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917. The breakdown of the73 Dollarization in Mexico
system began around 1913 and was reflected in a rapid depreciation of
paper money, extreme inflation and falsification of bank notes, defaults
in payments by the government and other debtors, and a general disloca-
tion of economic activity.
In 1916, monetary circulation consisted of gold and silver coins and
twenty-one types of paper money issued by different institutions and
revolutionary factions; these notes were mostly inconvertible into metal-
lic coins and were heavily discounted with respect to gold and silver. In an
effort to unify fiduciary circulation, the Carranza government authorized
the issue of 500 million pesos of "unforgeable" bank notes with a 20
percent gold guarantee in April 1916. However, these notes were not well
received by the public, and by November they had depreciated to less
than 1 percent of their face value in terms of gold. The following year, the
"unforgeable" was finally demonetized and became "inconvertible;" as a
result of this experience and other previous unsuccessful efforts, from
1917 to 1932 the Mexican monetary system consisted almost exclusively
of gold and siver coins. Evidence also exists that during that period a
substantial amount of foreign currency (mostly U.S. gold and silver
coins) circulated alongside Mexican currency.
1
The most important step toward the reorganization of the financial
system after the Revolution, was the creation of Banco de Mexico in
1925. Although the official charter granted the bank monopoly over the
issuance of paper money, it was not until the early thirties that the billetes
of Banco de Mexico began to circulate effectively. The original idea was
to establish a central bank in the British tradition; however, Banco de
Mexico began operating as an ordinary commercial bank, lending and
receiving deposits directly from the public.
Although a gold standard was formally adopted with the creation of
Banco de Mexico, the importance of the country as a silver producer
determined the existence of a de facto bimetallic standard.
2 The newly
created central bank attempted to stabilize the price of silver with respect
to gold to avoid excessive fluctuations of the real money stock. The price
of this metal remained stable during 1925 and 1926, but dipped about 10
percent in 1927 in response to the slowdown of the economic activity in
the United States. Banco de Mexico stopped minting silver coins during
that year, and the price of silver made some gains in 1928. However, the
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed had a very strong
impact on the price of the metal; from 1929 to 1932 the price of silver
declined by more than 50 percent (see table 4.1).
1. Martinez-Ostos (1946) and Cavazos (1976) provide an interesting discussion of
monetary events of the epoch.
2. Martinez-Ostos (1946). Although only gold coins had legal tender, both gold and
silver coins circulated widely. Fluctuations in the price of silver with respect to gold were
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CO b75 Dollarization in Mexico
The decline in the price of silver had a clear contractionary effect on the
money supply (measured in terms of gold) since an important proportion
of the money stock consisted of silver coins. In 1929 this decline was
compensated with an increase of Banco de Mexico's international re-
serves; however, in 1930 and 1931 the trade surplus was more than offset
with a capital (gold) outflow, and the central bank's reserves actually
declined. The combination of these price and reserve movements, com-
pounded with the decision of the monetary authorities to stop minting
silver coins to avoid a further erosion of the price of silver (derived from
the Ley Calles of 1931), resulted in a drastic reduction of the money stock
in 1931.
3
The contraction of the money stock in 1931 apparently had a severe
deflationary effect on economic activity. Prices fell by more than 10
percent per year in 1931 and 1932, while real output dropped nearly 15
percent in 1932, the greatest decline registered in Mexican economic
history in a single year.
While it remains true that the deflationary spirit of the 1931 legislation
was responsible at least for part of the decline of the money stock, it is not
clear that effective countercyclical measures could have been taken by
Banco de Mexico even if the government had deliberately embarked on
an expansionary monetary policy. Given the public's reluctance to accept
bank notes as part of their money holdings, the only means available to
the monetary authorities for expanding the quantity of money in circula-
tion was the minting of silver coins. However, an increase in the supply of
silver relative to gold would have put additional downward pressure on
the gold price of the newly minted coints, frustrating, at least partially,
the efforts to increase the (gold) money supply.
The deflationary policy was abandoned in 1932 when a new legislation
changing the statutory provisions governing the activities of Banco de
Mexico was enacted. The new law strengthened Banco de Mexico's
control over the issuance of bank notes, limited the amount of transac-
tions that the bank could undertake with the public and subjected mone-
tary reserves to direct control by the central bank. Also, the law required
all commercial banks to associate with Banco de Mexico, purchasing
stock and maintaining reserve deposits there. The minting of silver coins
was then resumed, the exchange rate was allowed to float, and the first
successful issues of bank notes were made. The scarcity of means of
payment was so acute in that year that a national campaign promoting the
3. In view of the substantial loss of metallic reserves and foreign currency that occurred
in the late 1920s, the Ley Calles of 1931 suspended convertibility of silver coins and retired
gold out of circulation; gold was to be used exclusively for international transactions. The
minting of silver coins was also stopped in an effort to prevent a decline of the silver peso
exchange rate.76 Guillermo Ortiz
Table 4.2 Composition of the (Narrowly Defined) Money Supply
(in percentages)
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Source: Banco de Mexico, S.A.
acceptance of the central bank's notes was endorsed by trade unions,
chambers of commerce, and various local associations.
4
As a result of the new silver mintings and note issues, and the favorable
impact on the trade balance of the peso's downward float, the money
supply increased 31 percent in 1932 and 15.4 percent in 1933. Also the
proportion of bank notes to the money supply increased from 0.4 percent
in 1931 to 10.5 percent in 1932 and 16.5 percent in 1933. (The structure of
the domestic money supply has evolved, as shown in table 4.2.) In
November 1933, Banco de Mexico fixed the exchange rate for the first
time at 3.60 pesos per dollar, this rate would prevail until 1938.
Figure 4.1 shows the ratios of foreign to domestic currency demand
deposits and total deposits held by households and firms in Mexican
private financial institutions from 1933 to 1979.
5
During the first fixed exchange rate period (from November 1933 until
March 1938) the demand deposits ratio fell consistently; by the end of
1937 less than 6 percent of checking deposits were denominated in
foreign currency. The years 1933-1936 were relatively stable and
prosperous. GDP grew at an average real rate of 8.3 percent, prices
increased by less than 5 percent on the average, and a continued trade
surplus—sustained by a hefty increase in the price of silver from 1933 to
1935—resulted in a net increase of Banco de Mexico's international
reserves of nearly 60 million dollars.
The ambitious social and economic development program launched by
President Cardenas in the mid-1930s required greater financial flexibility
4. See Cavazos (1976) and Carrillo-Flores (1976).
5. Consistent figures on total dollar deposits were obtained only after 1938. The institu-
tional distinction between private and official banking institutions in Mexico is important for
the purposes of this paper. Official banking institutions (such as Nacional Financiera) have
traditionally handled external foreign currency denominated borrowing by Mexican public
sector agencies, and their holdings of foreign currency liabilities reflect this borrowing
pattern. It is therefore more convenient to consider exclusively the liabilities of private
financial institutions (which held an average of 88 percent of total liabilities to the public
















from Banco de Mexico. In 1936, the statutory law of the bank was revised
one more time, further strengthening its position as a central bank. Two
important innovations were introduced then: first, the flexible reserve
requirement system that would serve as the instrument for the selective
credit control policies followed later; and, second, the authorization
granted to Banco de Mexico to issue fixed-yield securities on behalf of the
federal government. Taking advantage of expanded financial facilities,
the government deficit increased substantially in 1936 and 1937.
Although the upsurge in government expenditures had only a moder-
ate impact on the trade surplus, the U.S. recession and the capital outflow
caused by the populist policies followed by the Mexican government
resulted in a strong decline of international reserves in 1937. It was in this
climate of international recession and domestic troubles in the balance of
payments that President Cardenas signed the decree of nationalization of
the oil industry on March 18, 1938. That same day Banco de Mexico
withdrew from the foreign exchange market and the peso was allowed to
float again.
6 The year 1938 turned out to be extremely difficult for
Mexico; foreign retaliation in response to the oil takeover was felt im-
mediately (for example, oil exports declined 60 percent from 1937 to
1938), aggravating the already depressed economic situation. GDP in-
creased only 1.6 percent in real terms during that year.
The peso floated for thirty-one months. After two failed attempts at
fixing the exchange rate, in October 1940 Banco de Mexico announced a
new parity: 4.85 pesos to a dollar. The depreciation of the peso with
respect to its previous fixed value (in 1938) amounted to 34 percent. It is
apparent from figure 4.1 that a new process of dollarization began with
the floating of the peso; the dollar/peso deposit ratio reached its highest
point in September 1940 and declined substantially following the estab-
lishment of a fixed, peso-dollar exchange rate.
The outbreak of World War II provided Mexico some relief from
international pressures. Foreign demand for Mexican goods and services
stimulated economic activity (GDP increased at an average rate of 6.07
percent from 1941 to 1945), and a consistent trade surplus was registered
throughout the war years, reinforced by important inflows of capital
seeking refuge from war-ravaged Europe; Banco de Mexico's reserves
increased by more than 250 million dollars from 1941 to 1945. Again, the
dollarization coefficients showed an initial decline, stabilizing around a
value of 5 percent in 1944 and 1945.
6. The possibility of implementing exchange controls at the time of the expropriation
was apparently given serious consideration. However, President Cardenas himself, in his
1938 State of the Union address, declared that "exchange controls can only function in
highly disciplined countries where customs regulations are well organized and borders can
be effectively patrolled; exchange controls (in Mexico) would surely be overridden by a
black market" (Cavazos 1976, p. 83).79 Dollarization in Mexico
The fast pace of economic activity sustained during the war years was
also accompanied by a relatively high rate of inflation. The wholesale
price index increased 60.4 percent more in Mexico than in the United
States from 1941 to 1945; by the end of the war the peso was probably
overvalued. The following years, in 1946 and 1947, the largest historical
trade balance deficits were recorded, probably as a result of deferred
consumption during the war, and Banco de Mexico lost practically all the
reserves accumulated during the war years. In view of the continued loss
of reserves, the monetary authorities decided to float the peso in July
1948. This new experiment with a floating exchange rate lasted only
eleven months; in June 1949, the exchange rate was fixed at 8.65 pesos
per dollar (a devaluation of 76 percent). The dollarization coefficient
increased from 7.5 percent to 11.5 percent during the float, and there is
also evidence that substantial capital outflows occurred during these
months.
The 8.65 parity lasted from 1949 to 1954. Once more, the Korean War
stimulated export growth in 1950 and 1951; the favorable trade balance of
1950 was reinforced with new capital inflows (mostly returning capital
now that the float was over), and international reserves more than
doubled. In contrast, the economic activity was negatively affected in
1952 and 1953 by the new U.S. recession, causing a rapid deterioration of
the trade balance. In April 1954 the peso was devalued approximately 45
percent. This time the monetary authorities did not experiment with a
floating period, and the new parity was announced outright to the sur-
prise of many. This devaluation had a very strong psychological impact
on the public. In only two months following the announcement, capital
outflows reduced the central bank's reserves to one-half of their April
level, and the dollarization ratios jumped dramatically.
7
The exchange rate was maintained at 12.5 pesos to a dollar from April
1954 until September 1976. This period, the longest recorded with a fixed
exchange rate, includes two distinct subperiods. The first, known in the
literature as "stabilizing development" began after the adjustments to
the 1954 devaluation had been completed and lasted until the early 1970s.
A rapid rate of economic growth and low rates of inflation (averaging 6.5
and 2.95 percent from 1956 to 1971) were sustained through the combina-
tion of favorable international economic conditions and consistent
domestic monetary and fiscal policies. Foreign borrowing was used to
finance the persistent, but mostly moderate, trade deficits, preventing a
direct impact from the short-run behavior of international reserves on the
exchange rate as was experienced in the past.
8
7. The dollar/peso demand deposit ratio increased from 11.5 to 25 percent from March
to December; the total deposit ratio increased by a similar proportion. See figure 4.1.
8. This period of Mexican economic and financial development has been thoroughly
surveyed in recent literature. See, for example, Nassef (1972) and Solfs (1981).80 Guillermo Ortiz
The stable period ended with the upsurge of world inflation in 1973 and
the government's decision to spare Mexico from the parallel effects of
international recession by means of higher government expenditures.
Although a liberal use of foreign credits was utilized for this purpose (the
foreign long-term public debt jumped from 4 to 16 billion dollars from
1972 to 1976), the average growth rate of GDP in 1972-1976 (5.4 per-
cent) was lower than in the stable period, while the inflation rate turned
out to be significantly higher (14.76).
9
The dollarization ratios, which increased substantially after the 1954
devaluation and then stabilized around a 20-25 percent level in 1955 and
1956, began to climb again in the second quarter of 1957 and reached an
all time high at the end of 1958: the dollar/peso demand deposit ratio
exceeded 30 percent, while the total deposit dollar/peso ratio went over
46 percent. Both ratios commenced a steady decline again in 1959 that
continued through the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s; in the fourth
quarter of 1975, the value of the checking deposits ratio was only 6.2
percent, and the total deposit ratio was even lower.
The 1957-1958 dollarization was motivated both for economic and
political reasons. First, the downturn of economic activity in industrial-
ized countries during those years put strong pressure on the balance of
payments. The trade deficit almost trebled in 1957 (with respect to 1954)
and continued at very high levels in 1958; in that year, the reserves of
Banco de Mexico declined almost 20 percent. Second, 1958 was the last
year of President Ruiz-Cortinez's administration, and the private sector
felt queasy about the seemingly leftist overtones of Mr. Lopez-Mateos's
rhetoric (the official presidential candidate). However, in 1959 the trade
balance improved and the private sector was temporarily appeased,
ending the speculative burst against the peso.
On August 31,1976, the monetary authorities decided to float the peso
once more and "let the market determine its equilibrium level" instead of
devaluing outright as in 1954. The exchange rate rose quickly, reaching
levels of around 20-21 pesos to a dollar; two weeks later a temporary rate
was tried (19.5-19.7 pesos/dollar), but it had to be abandoned after five
weeks because of strong speculative activity. Since then, the peso has
been formally on a float, although the exchange rate has fluctuated within
very narrow margins since the second quarter of 1977. The magnitude of
the depreciation (about 45.50 percent in terms of dollars) was probably
greater than what was generally anticipated and, not surprisingly, had a
profound impact on economic activity.
1
0
9. For a more detailed account of events that led to the 1976 devaluation, see Ortiz and
Soli's (1979).
10. For instance, the three-month forward rate for the Mexican peso quoted in the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Market in June 1976 was about 13 pesos, implying a premium
of only 4 percent. For a discussion on the effects of the devaluation, see Cordoba and Ortiz
(1979).81 Dollarization in Mexico



























Source: Banco de Mexico, S.A.
The behavior of the dollarization coefficients after the 1976 devalua-
tion has been different from that observed in the previous periods with
floating exchange rates. While the checking deposit peso/dollar ratio
declined after the third quarter of 1977, the total deposit ratio has
remained at substantially higher levels (see table 4.3). The explanation
seems to be the liberalization of the Mex-dollar deposit rate in 1977.
Although private financial institutions were traditionally authorized to
receive deposits denominated in foreign currencies from the public, the
interest rate payable in these types of deposits was regulated by Banco de
Mexico and moved at infrequent intervals. In the more volatile world of
the 1970s, the authorities attempted to keep the Mex-dollar deposit rate
more in line with those prevailing abroad for similar types of deposits;
however, large and persistent differentials between Mex-dollar and inter-
national rates often developed. Finally, in view of the large capital
outflows that occurred after the peso was allowed to float, the monetary
authorities decided to peg the Mex-dollar deposit rates for different
maturities to the corresponding Eurodollar rates (March 1977). This
measure had the effect of slowing considerably the outflow of capital
since Mex-dollar deposits became perfect substitutes, except for political
risk factors, for dollar deposits held abroad.
1
1
4.3 Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates and Devaluation
Expectations: Effects on the Dollarization of Demand Deposits
The literature on currency substitution outlined in section 4.2 has
pointed out that, in the context of the existing international environment,
domestic residents have strong incentives to diversify the composition of
their currency holdings.
1
2 The same motives that exist for holding domes-
tic money apply to the demand for foreign currency. Individuals and firms
engaged in international exchange have similar transaction and portfolio
incentives for holding foreign currencies as they do for maintaining
11. The implication of this measure for domestic monetary policy has been explored
recently by Ortiz and Soli's (1982).
12. Miles (1978) and Alexander (1980).82 Guillermo Ortiz
domestic money balances. It is clear, for example, that people who travel
abroad for business or pleasure, residents of border areas, and importers
or exporters have incentives to hold foreign currency balances. Also,
large firms with liabilities denominated in foreign currencies will prob-
ably want to diversify their financial portfolios, particularly their holdings
of liquid assets.
The case of border transactions is particularly important in the Mex-
ican case. Given the length of the Mexican-U.S. border and its economic
importance, it can almost be considered a different currency area from
the rest of the country. Prices are usually quoted in dollars and payments
are mostly made in dollars; pesos, although accepted as a means of
payment on both sides of the border, are in less demand. The structure of
financial intermediation clearly reflects this pattern of transactions. The
average checking deposit dollar/peso ratio in the six more important
border cities from 1977 to 1980 was 51 percent, compared with a national
average of 12 percent.
Among the diverse reasons for holding foreign currency balances, the
currency substitution hypothesis emphasizes the importance of foreign
exchange risk effects. According to this hypothesis, the perceived risk of
holding exclusively domestic currency increases when the exchange rate
is floating. Consequently, there is a greater incentive to diversify the
portfolio of liquid money assets under floating rates than when the
exchange rate is fixed, and one would expect the dollarization of demand
and time deposits to behave accordingly.
1
3 Table 4.4 summarizes the
behavior of the demand deposit ratio during periods of fixed and floating
exchange rates.
The figures presented in table 4.4 seem to indicate precisely the oppo-
site behavior of the dollarization coefficient: the dollar/peso demand
deposit ratio has been lower and more stable, on the average, during the
periods when the exchange rate has been floating. This is true even if the
first fixed exchange rate period (highly dollarized and unstable, 1933-
13. It is not obvious why greater variability of the exchange rate should increase the
degree of risk of domestic currency holdings, since it could just as easily be interpreted as
increasing the risk of holding foreign currency. However, a number of arguments have been
advanced in favor of interpreting the variability of exchange rates as an incentive to diversify
currency holdings. Akhtar and Putnam (1980) argue that domestic currency provides less
information concerning international transactions when the exchange rate is floating and
may not serve as an optimal store of value for a given level of transactions, creating
incentives for diversification. Also, if fluctuations of the exchange rate between third
currencies are uncorrelated with movements of the domestic/foreign currency exchange
rate, some portfolio holders will find incentives to diversify, reducing the share of domestic
currency in their portfolios. Miles and Stewart (1980) also investigate the effects of ex-
change rate risk (measured again by the variability of the exchange rate) using a "produc-
tion function of money services." Both papers find a statistically significant negative effect
of movements in the deutsche mark/dollar exchange rate, both in the demand for dollars


















































Source: Banco de Mexico, S.A.
"Weighted by relative length of the period.
"Excluding the 1933(I)-1937(IV) period.
1937) is not taken into account. It should be kept in mind, however, that
the floating exchange rate periods have been relatively short (about thirty
quarters from 1933 to 1980), and also that Banco de Mexico has inter-
vened constantly in the foreign exchange market when the peso has been
"floating." Hence, the fixed/floating exchange rate distinction does not
seem to shed much light on the dollarization process.
Going back to figure 4.1, it can be observed that the largest jumps of
the dollarization ratio (after 1937) occurred in 1940, 1952, 1954, 1957-
1958, and 1976; of these dates, 1940,1952,1958, and 1976 correspond to
the last year of the incumbent administrations, while a devaluation also
occurred in 1954 and in 1976. It seems, then, that both political variables
and devaluation expectations must play a crucial role in explaining the
historical record of Mexican dollarization; this proposition deserves a
closer examination.
Consider the following simple money demand formulations:
(1) ^ = LV,^r,9,^),




f/P are real domestic and foreign desired money
balances; ir
d, ir^, and r are the real returns on domestic currency, foreign
currency, and an alternative asset; 9 is a measure of foreign exchange
risk; £ is a proxy for political risk factors, and w is real wealth. Assuming
that (1) and (2) can be expressed as exponential functions, and writing the
relative returns in differential form, the money demand functions can be
written:84 Guillermo Ortiz
(3) ^L = ao(w) exp [a^u
4 - IT') + a2(ir
r
f - r) + a30
+ + +
(4) y- = Po(w) exp [frCir'- IT*) + &(<*'- r) + p3« + P4],
+ + + + +
where the signs under the coefficients indicate partial derivatives. Sub-
tracting (3) from (4), taking logarithms and rearranging terms, the fol-
lowing equation is obtained:
- P2(^- r) + (a3 - P3)0 + (a4 -
Imposing the following symmetry condition to equation (5): a, = (3/ for
/ = 0,1,.. .4, and adding a random term ut, the following expression is
obtained:
(6) In |^J = ax{>nf-iT
d) + a2% + a3^ + ut,
where at = (2aj + a2), a2 = 2a1? and a3 = 2a4.
1
4 Equation (6) was in-
corporated in a partial adjustment model to obtain a final estimating
equation,
(7) l
where bl = \au b2 = \a2, b3 = X«3, b4 = (1 - \), and ef = kut. M
d and M^ are peso and dollar demand deposits held by the public in
Mexican private financial institutions.
1
5 For a Mexican resident, the real
return of the holdings of domestic currency, u
d, can be approximated by
the rate of inflation. The real return on foreign money is simply ^ = Tr
d
plus the expected percentage rise in the peso price of dollars. Hence, the
differential (TT^— Tr
d) is just the expected depreciation of the exchange
rate. Since a futures market for Mexican pesos did not exist during most
of the period under consideration, an obvious proxy for the expected rate
14. The restrictions imposed on equation (5) prevent the identification of the substitu-
tion coefficients o^ and a2 in equation (6). However, this is not important for the purpose of
this exercise. Note also that p3, p4 < 0.
15. Since no data on dollar currency circulation in Mexico are available, only demand
deposits were included in the definition of M
d.85 Dollarization in Mexico
of devaluation of the exchange rate is the difference between the official
and the real exchange rate.
As mentioned above, previous studies have used some measure of
variability of the exchange rate as a proxy for foreign exchange risk.
However, given the length of the period in which the exchange rate was
fixed, the deviations of the real exchange rate from the trend rate were
used here as a measure of foreign exchange risk. Finally, a dummy
variable was included in the years when administration changes occurred
to take into account the "political risk" factor mentioned earlier. Equa-
tion (7) was estimated using quarterly data from 1933(1) to 1980(IV), and
the results are shown in equation (8). ED stands for the expected de-
valuation proxy, ER for the foreign exchange risk measure, and PRD for
the political risk dummy.
1
6 After some experimentation, a simple two-
period lag structure for the independent variables was found to perform
adequately.
(8) (^d)= 0.059 EDr_!+ 0.053 EDf_2 + 0.066 ERr
^
M (1.70) (1.83) (2.23)
+ 0.045 ER,_2 + 0.079 PRD + 0.932 ^





2 = 0.907, DW = 2.20, SE = 0.157.
Figures in parenthesis correspond to ^-statistics.
The regression results are satisfactory in spite of the somewhat crude
measures of differential returns and of the risk of exchange rate varia-
tions. All the coefficients estimated have the correct sign and are signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence, except for
the second lagged term of the risk variable which is insignificant. It should
also be kept in mind that only part of the monetary aggregates (namely
demand deposits) were included in M
f and M
d, and consequently, the
variations of the currency/deposit ratio that affect the dollarization coeffi-
cient were not taken into account.
The difficulties of obtaining good measures of devaluation expecta-
tions for such a long period of time in the absence of a forward market are
quite obvious. However, the effects of the devaluations of 1954 and 1976,
as well as the impact of the devaluation expectations prevailing in 1976,
on the dollarization of demand deposits can also be studied using in-
tervention analysis directly from the time series.
Intervention analysis is a statistical method developed by Box and Tiao
(1975) for the purpose of detecting and quantifying the effect of an
16. ER was generated from the residuals of a regression between the real exchange rate
and a trend variable.86 Guillermo Ortiz
exogenous event on the behavior of time series.
1
7 However, this proce-
dure requires the series to be stationary (that is, to have constant mean
and variance), so the original dollar/peso demand deposit ratio could not
be studied directly. The analysis was performed on the growth rate of the
original series, and the results show that the growth rate of the dollariza-
tion ratio increased 45.6 percent in the second quarter of 1954, returning
immediately (the following quarter) to its original level. The 1976 de-
valuation's effect on the growth of the dollarization coefficient was also
concentrated in one quarter: the fourth of 1976, when the ratio jumped 63
percent.
4.4 Effects of Dollarization
The monetary and real effects of dollarization on economic activity will
obviously depend on the degree to which domestic currency is being
displaced by dollars. If the substitution process goes to the extreme of
eliminating or substantially reducing the circulation of domestic coins and
currency, the monetary habitat of the country will be changed. This
implies, of course, handing to the United States (or the country issuing
the substitute currency) the seigniorage of money creation and seriously
eroding the base of the inflation tax.
1
8 Even in less drastic situations, it has
been pointed out in the currency substitution literature that substantial
monetary instability might arise as a result of diversified currency hold-
ings by domestic residents. The relevance of this substitution problem for




One method of estimating the potential monetary instability problems
of currency substitution is to simply examine the properties of alternative
definitions of monetary aggregates. If dollar deposits are effectively
regarded by the public as money, they should be included as part of the
money stock for policy making purposes. Alternatively, if the currency
substitution problem is important, domestic money demand estimations
that fail to account for the foreign currency component should be un-
stable. To explore the relevance of this question for the case of Mexico, a
17. See Appendix A for details.
18. See the chapter by Stanley Fischer in this volume (chapter 3).
19. Miles (1978) used Canadian data to estimate a "production function of monetary
services" obtaining direct measures of elasticities of substitution between U.S. and Cana-
dian dollars. He finds that both currencies are close portfolios substitutes, especially during
period of floating rates. Also utilizing Canadian data, Alexander (1980) included several
"foreign influence" variables on the demand for money (such as expected returns on foreign
currency holdings and exchange rate risk), obtaining low elasticities of substitution. In
contrast to Miles, this author concludes that the currency substitution phenomenon has not
posed important problems for the achievement of monetary policy objectives in Canada.87 Dollarization in Mexico
conventional money demand equation based on a partial adjustment
model was estimated using quarterly data from 1960 to 1979, using two
definitions of the monetary aggregate: M
J = currency (pesos) + peso
demand deposits, and M
k = currency (pesos) + peso demand deposits
+ dollar demand deposits. The estimated equation was:
(9) In ^— = a0 + <*! In Y




+ a5ln +d1 + d2 + d3 + et. \ P It-i
where (M
J'
k/P) is the real monetary aggregate; Y
ct is current real income;
RL, is the interest rate payable on short-term Mexican peso deposits; FR,
is the three-month Eurodollar deposit rate; IR is the expected rate of
inflation; dt, d2, and d3 are dummies included to correct for seasonal
variations, and et is a random error term.
2
0 Since the monetary authorities
in Mexico fix the normal deposit rate, this variable does not always
capture expected inflation. This is why both variables are included in
equation (9).
Estimates of equation (9) from 1960 to 1979 are reported in table 4.5.
The regression results for both definitions of money are very similar;
perhaps the most striking difference is the income elasticity term which
turns out to be not significantly different from zero for the M
k aggregate.
Note also that the foreign interest rate coefficient is not significantly
different from zero for either equation. Static and dynamic simulations
were performed to examine the question of stability. Equation (9) was
estimated from 1960 to 1972, and simulated from 1973 to 1979; a sum-
mary of the simulation results is included in table 4.6.
The simulation results are very similar for both aggregates and only
slightly better for M
k. The truly remarkable outcome of the simulations is
the smallness of the errors both in the static and in the dynamic exercises.
The largest dynamic errors obtained correspond to the last observations
of 1979 and represent less than 2 percent of the dependent variable. The
magnitude of average errors for the postdevaluation period, 1976(1 V)-
1977(IV), is less than 0.5 percent for both equations. On the basis of this
performance, the demand for domestic currency appears to be highly
stable, and either definition M
7 or M
k seems appropriate for purposes of
policy making.
20. The estimation of equation (9) was taken from Ortiz (1982). The expected rate of
inflation was calculated simply as a weighted average of current and lagged values. Several
measures of expected inflation (including instrumental variables and a Box-Jenkins gener-
ated series consistent with the rational expectations approach) were tried in Ortiz (1982),
but the results did not differ substantially from those reported here. See Appendix B for































































The discussion of the previous sections suggests that the difficulties
associated with the presence of currency substitution have not been
empirically significant for Mexico. The dollarization of demand deposits
has not been more pronounced during periods of floating exchange rates
and, apparently, no instability has been introduced in the demand for
domestic currency by the fact that both pesos and dollars are held by the
public in the form of monetary assets. This conclusion is reinforced by the
good performance of the money demand simulations in the difficult
months following the 1976 devaluation.
The behavior of the dollar/peso demand deposit ratio has been in-
fluenced by economic as well as political considerations; among the
former, devaluation expectations seem to be the most important factor.
An interesting observation is that the last two devaluations seem to have
fostered exchange rate risk expectations, at least temporarily, instead of
appeasing them.
Although the empirical analysis was restricted to the behavior of
demand deposits, the dollarization of time deposits has followed closely
the movements of the dollar/peso demand deposit ratio until recent
times. It was mentioned that the liberalization of Mex-dollar deposit rates
had the effect of making Mex-dollar deposits near perfect substitutes for
dollar deposits held abroad, and this explains the relative increase of the
dollarization of time deposits. However, this need not concern the
monetary authorities. Now that the Mexican banking system offers a
competitive menu of foreign currency denominated financial assets,
domestic investors will find little incentive to maintain deposits abroad,
and consequently, short-run speculative capital flows should be
reduced.
2
1 To the extent that the dollarization consists of locally produced
21. A recent theoretical paper by Alain Ize (1981) lends support to this view. Ize also
concludes that the existence of Mex-dollar deposits has resulted in a more efficient alloca-
tion of financial resources.90 Guillermo Ortiz
dollars, the negative effects on economic activity can probably be mini-
mized with appropriate exchange rate insurance mechanisms on the
credit side.
4.6 An Addendum
On 18 August 1982 (almost a year and a half after the first draft of this
paper was completed), the monetary authorities decreed that mexdollar
deposits could no longer be transferred out of the country. Henceforth,
mexdollar deposits would be paid in domestic currency at the rate of 70
pesos to a dollar. A few days later, on 1 September, a system of full
exchange controls was imposed in Mexico for the first time in several
decades. These decisions marked the end of the mexdollar market.
It is clear that the effectiveness of the mexdollar market to absorb
short-term capital flows depended on the public's perception of close
substitution between mexdollars and dollars held abroad. Hence, the
commitment of the monetary authorities to maintain full convertibility of
the peso and unrestricted capital flows was a key element of the public's
trust of the system. As the Mexican economy's financial troubles
deepened during the first months of 1982 and the public's confidence that
the authorities would undertake the necessary macroeconomic adjust-
ments faltered, the mexdollar market ceased functioning as a shock
absorber. Large capital outflows occurred, and the authorities decided to
cancel the potential threat of a run on mexdollars that could not possibly
have been met with the available foreign exchange reserves.
Appendix A: Intervention Analysis
This procedure involves the following steps: First, the series to be
analyzed is represented as a stochastic model of the Box-Jenkins (1976)
type, such as an ARIMA model. Second, a dynamic intervention func-
tion, constructed a priori to represent the type of exogenous event under
consideration, is constructed. Third, the iterative Box-Jenkins technique
is used again to represent the complete model, including the intervention
function. The effect of the exogenous event can then be quantified by the
magnitude of the intervention function coefficients.
2
2
The exogenous events (or interventions) considered here are: (a) the
1954 devaluation that occurred during the second quarter of 1954; and (b)
the devaluation expectations of 1976 and the devaluation itself that
occurred in September of that year. The objective, then, is to explore the
effects of these events on the demand deposit dollar/peso ratio DDRf
22. See Box and Tiao (1975).91 Dollarization in Mexico
(taken quarterly from 1939[I] to 1980[IV]). As a first step, the trans-
formation (1 - B) In (DDR,), where B is a lag operator, such that
BZ = Z,_! for any variable Z, was applied to DDRf to obtain a station-
ary series with constant mean and variance. Note that the transformed
series
•t-1
where 7, is the growth rate of the dollarization coefficient. A Box-Jenkins
type model was estimated for each of the following periods: 1939(1)—
1954(1), 1939(I)-1976(I), and 1939(I)-1980(IV); the results are shown in
table 4.7.
The 6 coefficients in the above models represent moving average
parameters and the sequence {at} is a white noise Gaussian process with
mean zero and constant variance u
2a. The u>'s are parameters of the
intevention functions.
pi = Jl for t = i 1 \0 otherwise, / = I, II,
where P
l is a pulse indicator designed to detect an instantaneous jump of
the series at the time when the "interventions" seem to have occurred,
namely, I = 1954(11) and II = 1976(11). This particular form of interven-
tion function eT = wo-P/
1 (chosen after testing other functional forms)
seems appropriate to model the effects of the first depreciation because of
















































"The Q statistic should be compared with the value of X
2 with (k) degrees of freedom (see
Box and Jenkins 1976).92 Guillermo Ortiz
expectations seem to have been widespread in the months prior to the
devaluation of 1976; substantial capital outflows were registered in the
first half of the year, particularly during the second quarter. A dynamic
intervention function designed to pick up the effects of devaluation
expectations of 1976(11) was constructed and incorporated into the
model; however, preliminary estimation failed to show any significant
effects during the second and third quarters.
2
3 Finally, the model for the
whole period was estimated incorporating a simple intervention function
en(0 = oi\B
2Pt
n to capture the effects of the 1976 devaluation. Figure 4.2
depicts graphically the effects of the estimations presented in table 4.7.
As mentioned in the text, the growth rate of the dollarization ratio
increased 45.6 percent in the second quarter of 1954, then returned to its
original level. The 1976 devaluation's effect on the series was concen-
trated in the fourth quarter of that year (increasing 63 percent). Also, the
devaluation expectations of the preceding months did not significantly
affect the dollarization ratio.
Appendix B: Data Sources
Demand deposits in pesos and dollars are regularly published in the
Informes Anuales and Indicadores Economicos of Banco de Mexico.
Data on earlier years (since 1925) will soon be published by the Oficina de
Cuentas Financieras, Subdireccion de Investigacion Economica, Banco
de Mexico, S.A.
Interest rates on Mexican time deposits have been published regularly
only since 1972. However, a statistical appendix in Ortiz (1982) provides
a previously unpublished series, weighted by the relative participation of
the different financial instruments.
The Mexican consumer price index was utilized to deflate income and
monetary variables. Quarterly data on prices before 1968 were con-
structed by applying seasonal variations observed in the consumer price
index to the GDP deflator. Quarterly income data were also obtained by
applying seasonal movements of the Mexican index of industrial produc-
tion to real GDP. These series are also available in the statistical appen-
dix of Ortiz (1982).
23. The intervention function postulated for the 1976 devaluation was of the form:
en(0~l T^ r' '
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Comment Thomas J. Sargent
The subjects of "dollarization" and seigniorage involve fundamental and
still controversial aspects of monetary economics. Views on these sub-
jects stem directly from judgments about the theoretical models
appropriate to explain why inconvertible (or "flat") currencies command
value. Currently, a variety of theories about the "demand for money"
have adherents. These theories differ in terms of the economic forces that
they adduce to assign a currency value, the relevance that they attach to
distinctions between "inside" and "outside" money, and whether they
give rise to well-defined and stable demand functions for national monies
in a world of flexible exchange rates.
Theories of money begin from the observation that there is no role for
unbacked fiat currency in the standard general equilibrium model of
Arrow and Debreu, with its complete array of frictionless, state contin-
gent futures markets. To provide room for an inconvertible currency, it is
necessary to deviate from the Arrow-Debreu assumptions and to posit
some source of friction that inhibits at least some of the trades envisaged
by Arrow and Debreu. Theories of money differ in the ways that they
introduce these frictions and the explicitness with which the theorizing is
done.
One popular way of motivating a demand for money in a general
equilibrium model is to resort to Sidrauski's (1967) device of adding real
balances to the instantaneous utility function of a model that is otherwise
isomorphic to a version of a Cass-Koopmans optimum growth model.




where 5 > 0 is an instantaneous rate of time preference, ct is per capita
consumption of a single good, m, is "nominal balances," and pt is the
nominal price level. Such a model is capable of generating a well-
behaved, smooth demand function for the aggregate of assets included in
Thomas J. Sargent is a professor in the Department of Economics, University of
Minnesota, and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His
comments are directed to both the paper by Stanley Fischer and the paper by Guillermo
Ortiz.96 Guillermo Ortiz
nominal balances, mt. This demand schedule permits the assets mt to be
dominated in rate of return by the alternative assets (corporate and
government bonds, equities, or physical capital) that households have
access to. Real balances are dominated in rate of return by those other
assets to the extent that they provide utility directly, that is, to the extent
that u2>0. An important aspect of this theory is that very different
principles are used to assign value to real balances, on the one hand, and
to all other assets, on the other. All other assets are valued according to
the utility value of the streams of consumption that they support in
equilibrium. There is an asymmetry here, in that all assets except real
balances are valued according to the principle of modern finance theory,
which prices assets in such a way that no asset's return is dominated in
equilibrium by the return on any other collection of assets.
In a theory of this kind, the analyst in effect decides a variety of
important issues when he defines precisely what collection of assets enters
the category of "real balances," or mtlpt. Is mtlpthigh-powered money, as in the formal models of Sidrauski (1967), Brock (1974), and Fischer,
thereby excluding inside money or that portion of demand deposits and
time deposits that is not fully backed by high-powered money? The
arguments that are used to justify including mtlpt in the utility function are
widely interpreted as arguing for a broader aggregate including some
components of inside debt, such as demand deposits, bank notes, and
bills of exchange.
1 A closely related question is: For residents of a given
country, are real balances denominated in foreign currencies included in
mjpt in (1)? It certainly seems plausible to posit, for example, that, for a
two-country world, agents in country ; maximize
(2) SMC
0 I Pir Pit!
where cJt is consumption in country;, m[t is nominal balances of country i
held by residents of country;, and/?,, is the price level in terms of country /
currency. At this level of theorizing, positing (2) seems as plausible as
positing that agents in country 1 maximize
r = 0




1. By introducing some heterogeneity of endowments and preferences across agents in a
Sidrauski-like model, markets for consumption and production loans can be included, so
that inside debt can be incorporated into the model. The properties of such a model would
depend sensitively on what fraction of inside debt one included in the concept of real
balances that enters the utility function.97 Dollarization in Mexico
Equations (3) and (4) assert that country 1 residents just happen to have
"dollars" in their utility function and not "pounds," while country 2
residents just happen to have "pounds" and not "dollars." While these
assumptions give rise to smooth and well-behaved demands for national
currencies and a determinate theory of exchange rates, they are not
useful for addressing the dollarization phenomenon described by Mr.
Ortiz. However, the use of the criterion function (2) in a two-country
Sidrauski model can readily be shown to imply a severe dollarization
problem under a regime of flexible exchange rates and no capital con-
trols. In particular, the resulting model has the properties that there are
not smooth, well-defined demand schedules for particular national cur-
rencies, and that there is not even a unique equilibrium exchange rate.
Thus, the predictions of the model depend very sensitively on the particu-
lar aggregate that the analyst chooses for "real balances." No first princi-
ples seem available to guide that choice for an analysis conducted at this
level.
The same set of questions arises in models with "cash in advance"
constraints, of the kind analyzed by Clower and by Lucas (1980). Here
the idea is to have individuals maximize a Cass-Koopmans utility func-
tional model involving only consumption
(5) I u(ct)e~
bt,
but to add the "cash in advance" constraint,
(6) ptc,<mt-X,
to the other intertemporal constraints of a version of a Cass-Koopmans
model. A smooth, well-behaved demand schedule for real balances is
obtained by forcing individuals to transact in the particular set of assets
included in mt_ 1 in the Clower constraint (6). This constraint permits the
assets included in m,_! to be dominated in return by the other assets in
the model. As in the Sidrauski model, the choice of assets to include in
mf_x sensitively conditions the conclusions of the analysis, especially
from the point of view of the issues raised in the preceding papers by
Fischer and Ortiz.
The same questions again arise if one attempts to use the reasoning
underlying the Baumol (1952) and»Tobin (1956) transactions costs mod-
els: to generate a demand for a particular class of assets called "money"
that is dominated in terms of rate of return because business is less costly
to transact with it. For example, it is hard to imagine a reasonable
specification of a physical transaction cost technology that would natu-
rally give rise to a situation in which, in equilibrium, each country turns
out to have its own national money. Again, the Baumol-Tobin setup is
silent on the question of the particular class of assets that is to be called
money and with which business is less costly to transact.98 Guillermo Ortiz
The final brand of monetary theory that I will mention is based on the
insight of Paul Samuelson (1958) that if sufficient "missing links" are
introduced into a general equilibrium model, via spatial or temporal
separation of agents, then a role for a properly managed inconvertible
currency can emerge. Such models obtain a valued fiat currency by direct
restrictions on the endowment patterns, locations in time and space, and
technological possibilities for transforming goods over time and space.
One popular example of this class of models is Samuelson's model of
overlapping generations of two-period-lived agents, which has been used
by Cass-Yaari (1966), Lucas (1972), Wallace (1980), and others to ex-
amine outstanding questions in macroeconomics. However, other mod-
els with agents who live more than two periods, such as those analyzed by
Townsend (1980) and Tesfatsion (1980), embody the same general kind
of missing-links friction that characterizes Samuelson's model. As in the
previous kinds of models, issues of inside and outside money and of
international currency substitution also arise in the context of these
missing-links models. However, in these models the analysis is conducted
at a more primitive level that naturally directs the analyst's attention
toward the forces that make inside money displace (and devalue) outside
money, and that make foreign currency compete with domestic currency.
Kareken and Wallace (1978,1981) have used a version of Samuelson's
model to analyze currency substitution, while Wallace (1980) and Sargent
and Wallace (1981) have used such a model to analyze inside-outside
money issues. To illustrate the issues raised by this brand of monetary
theory for the subject of this paper, I shall briefly consider the following
parametric, nonstochastic, two-country, pure exchange overlapping gen-
erations model.
At each date r>l, there are born in country / Nj two-period-lived
agents. Within each country, the agents are identically endowed both
within and across time periods. There is a single, nonstorable consump-
tion good. Let w{(t) be the endowment of t period goods of an agent in
country / who is born at time s. Let c[{t) be the consumption of t period
goods of an agent in country ;' who is born at time s. I assume the
stationary endowment pattern
The young of each generation in each country are assumed to maximize
the logarithmic utility function
(8) lnc?(0 + lnc?(r+l).
This utility function implies the saving function99 Dollarization in Mexico
(saving of an agent in country / who is young at t) =
(9)
where R (t) is the real gross rate of return on saving between times t and
t+1, denominated in time (t + 1) goods per unit of time t goods.
At time t = 1, there are Nj old people in country;'. The old in country 1
are in the aggregate endowed with /Ji(0) units of government-supplied
inconvertible paper currency, denominated in "dollars." The old in
country 2 are in the aggregate endowed with H2(0) units of government-
supplied inconvertible paper currency, denominated in "pesos." The
government of country; has a.policy of financing a real deficit of G[^0,
t= 1, 2,.. .by creating additional fiat money. The government budget
constraints are
. Kit) - H,(t - 1)
(1°) Or 77 ,;-l,2,
Pj(t)
where Pj(t) is the price of time t goods, measured in units of; country
currency per unit of time t goods. Below I shall characterize policy by
Hj(t) paths, and not G{ paths. The G[ path will be endogenous.
Consider a free-trade, flexible exchange rate regime in which agents in
the two countries are permitted to borrow from and lend to each other
freely and to hold each other's national currencies. Since there is no
uncertainty, if the fiat currencies are to be valued (i.e., \ipj(i) < °°), they
must bear the same real rates of return with each other and with con-
sumption loans (or "inside debt").
2 The real gross rate of return on




The ratio pi(t)/p2(t) = e(0 is the exchange rate, measured in dollars per
peso. Equation (11) states that the exchange rate e(i) must be constant
over time if the currencies are to bear the same gross real rates of return.
So we have e(t) = e for a\\ t> 1.
2. Tobin's (1958) theory of the demand for money also requires that the return on money
not be dominated by the return on any possible portfolio of assets.100 Guillermo Ortiz
The sequence of equilibrium conditions for this two-country, world
economy can be written, for t>\, as
(net saving of young of country 1)
+ (net saving of young of country 2) =
(net dissaving of old of countries 1 and 2)
-I- (net dissaving of government of country 1)
+ (net dissaving of government of country 2).
Net dissaving of the old at t is given by Hx(t - l)lpx{t) + H2(t - I)lp2{t), while net dissaving of government; is G[. Substituting from (9) and (10),
and using
Pi(t)/Pi(t + 1) =p2(t)/pi(t + 1) = R(t),
these equilibrium conditions can be written
J_ AT
 ttl ^^





This equation can be rewritten, using p2(t) =p1(t)/e, as
Pi(t)
Multiplying by p^t) and rearranging, we have the difference equation in
(13) Pl(t) = kPl(t + 1) + cj>[#x(O + eH2(t)l & 1,
where
(^N + aN\ 2
N&+N2CH
If possible, the difference equation (13) is to be solved for a sequence of
price levels (pi(t), t=\,2,...) and an exchange rate e>0. It happens,
however, that the difference equation (13) cannot determine all of these
endogenous variables. Kareken and Wallace (1981) describe this fact by
stating that the equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate or underde-
termined. So long as all the price levelp^{t) for all dates t>: 1 is regarded101 Dollarization in Mexico
as endogenous, Kareken and Wallace's characterization must be
accepted.
We say that a fiat money equilibrium exists if the difference equation
(13) has a solution withp!(/)e(0,oc) for t> 1. The general solution of the
difference equation (13) is
(14) Pl(t) = 4 5 XH^t + 0 + e$ I X'#2(f + 0
» = 0 i = 0
where c is an_y arbitrary constant. So long as G{>0 and f>l in (10), a
necessary condition for the difference equation (13) to have a solution
with <*>>Pl(t)>0 is X<1. The parameter X = ($2Ni + OL2N2)/ {$\NX + a.1N2) is the real gross rate on consumption loans in the pure
consumption loans (or pure "inside debt") economy.
3 This is a version of
Samuelson's result: For there to be a role for the "social contrivance" of
inconvertible currency, an economy with inside debt alone must not
provide a real gross rate of return in excess of the gross rate of growth of
the economy.
If X < 1, the existence of a flat money equilibrium depends on the paths
of H^t) and H2(t) for t> 1. To take a concrete case, suppose that
H2(t) = z2H2(t-l),t>\.
We assume that \<zx<z2. Then we have the following situation: If
Xzx < 1 and Xz2< 1, a continuum of fiat money equilibrium solutions of
(13) is given by
(15) Pi(0 = —%-- Hx{t) + e -±- H2(t)
l-\Zi 1 - Xz2
for any °o > e > 0, and any c > 0. If Xzx < 1 and Xz2 > 1, then a continuum
of fiat money equilibrium solutions of (13) is given by
(16)
1-
3. Notice that where there is no fiat currency, the equilibrium condition for the world
economy is
(net saving of young of country 1)
+ (net saving of young of country 2) - 0,
= 0.
2 2 R(t)\ '[2 2 R(t)
The solution for the gross real rate of return of consumption loans is
R(t) = (p2Ni + a2A^2)/(PiA
ri + aiAT2).102 Guillermo Ortiz
withe^O, and any c>0. If Xz!>l, the solution of (13) is/?1(/) = + °°, so
that neither fiat currency is valued.
The nature of these solutions reveals that the valuation of national
currencies is tenuous for several reasons.
4 First, when Xz2<l, so that
solution (14) is pertinent, then the equilibrium exchange rate is underde-
termined, with any constant e in the closed interval [0, °°] being an
equilibrium exchange rate. This is Kareken and Wallace's celebrated
result about the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates under
laissez-faire. Second, so long as X < 1 and kz1 < 1, a continuum of equilib-
ria exists (indexed by the parameter c > 0). All of these equilibria, except
the stationary equilibrium with c = 0, have p\(t) following an explosive,
self-fulfilling speculative bubble in which the real value of currency
asymptotically goes to zero. Third, confining oneself to the stationary
(c = 0) equilibrium, the more inside debt there is, or equivalently, the
more private borrowers there are relative to private lenders, the higher is
the equilibrium price level. Thus, equation (12) can be rewritten
+ [H1(t) + eH2(t)]i
where the left-hand side is total nominal debt, the first bracketed term on
the right-hand side is "inside" nominal indebtedness, and the second
bracketed term on the right-hand side is nominal value of world currency
supply; nominal values are measured in dollars. Notice that in a fiat
money equilibrium the ratio of inside nominal debt to the total nominal
debt is given by
5
Pi(t) Pi(t)
The larger the value of X, the smaller the base of the inflation tax and the
smaller the maximal sustained amount of real revenue that can be raised
jointly by the two governments. Further, if X> 1, we have seen that no
fiat money equilibrium exists. Thus, private indebtedness competes with
public indebtedness and limits the ability of the government to collect
revenues through an inflation tax. Fourth, the valuation of national
currencies is tenuous because it depends on the government not running
deficits that are too large far into the future, that is, it depends on the
government's repeated fiscal policies, as is exhibited directly by (14) or by
the restrictions on zx and z2 in the special versions of solutions (15) and
(16).
6
4. Neil Wallace (1980) has emphasized this feature of inconvertible currencies.
5. Equations (14) and (15) imply that /?!(?+ \)lpx{t)>l.
6. It is interesting to pose the following "optimal stationary seigniorage" question for
this model. Given the exchange rate e, the real rate at which both governments together103 Dollarization in Mexico
Although the equilibrium value of the exchange rate is indeterminate,
its value is important to the two governments, since it helps to determine
the real value of the inflation tax revenues collected by each government
(see [10] and [14]).
7 The scope of trade in inside debt is also significant
from the viewpoint of the real amount of inflation tax that each govern-
ment can potentially collect.
8
This model thus implies, under a regime of flexible exchange rates and
no capital controls, that dollarization will be a very important problem.
This is particularly true if the economy with the larger deficits follows so
expansionary a fiscal policy (e.g., \z2 > 1) that its currency is predicted to
be valueless. The model indicates that a government intent on extracting
an inflation tax from its own residents, or intent on preventing other
countries from imposing such a tax on its residents, has substantial
incentives to deviate from a regime of flexible exchange rates and capital
mobility. That is, it has an incentive to impose currency and capital
controls. The model also implies that such a government has a strong
incentive to restrict and to regulate the scope of both domestic and
international financial intermediaries that issue currency-like (i.e., small-
denomination, low-risk) assets that compete with domestic currency in
the portfolios of private agents.
9
There are a variety of possible forms that the exchange interventions
and regulations of intermediaries can take that are sufficient to render the
equilibrium exchange rate determinate and the demand for domestic
high-powered money well defined. Kareken and Wallace (1981) and
Nickelsburg (1980) have studied several such intervention schemes. Here
it should simply be mentioned that various kinds of implicit and state
contingent threats, which perhaps need actually never be executed, are
sufficient to render the exchange rate determinate. In interpreting time
series data, in principle, it may be difficult to determine whether a system
is truly operating under a laissez-faire regime "now and forever," or
collect revenues through the inflation tax is G = H(t) - H{t- \)lpi{t), where
H{t) = Hx(i) + eH2(t). Let the "world money supply" follow the law H{t) = zH(t- 1).
Then what value of z maximizes the sustainable value of G in stationary equilibrium? If the
real gross rate of return on consumption loans in the nonfiat money equilibrium X is greater
than unity, no real revenues can be raised through the inflation tax. If \< 1, the revenue-
maximizing value of z turns out to be V(l/X).
7. Notice that in this economy there are not well-defined demand functions for the
individual countries' currency stocks or for inside debt. Because all of these assets are
perfect substitutes in lenders' portfolios, only a demand function for the total indebtedness,
which can be thought of as the "total world money supply," is well denned. The real demand
for this aggregate is equal to {N\$\ + N2a.i)/2.
8. The model is silent on the question of what currency inside debts are denominated in
terms of.
9. I have set up the model so that residents within each country are identically endowed
and have identical preferences. This means that all "inside debt" occurs in the form of
international private loans. From the point of view of the points made here, it would have
made no substantial difference if I had introduced heterogeneity of agents' preferences and
endowments within each country to open up the possibility of within-country inside debt.104 Guillermo Ortiz
whether demands for inconvertible currencies are being influenced by
some such implicit threats.
As do the other models of money that we have discussed, the Kareken-
Wallace model has serious deficiencies. To get at the issues at an explicit
and deep level, while maintaining analytical tractability, the model over-
simplifies by severely restricting the technology, the life cycle, and the
temporal distribution of agents. In fact, the physical and economic setup
is so restricted that no one would seriously entertain econometrically
estimating the free parameters of such a model by the appropriate econ-
ometric techniques of the post-Lucas critique (1976) era.
1
0 In interpreting
the time series data, Kareken and Wallace do not seem to intend that
their model be taken literally. In this sense, the model of Kareken and
Wallace cannot yet serve as an entirely rigorous guide in formulating time
series econometric specifications. However, it is possible to imagine
generalizations of Kareken and Wallace's model along the lines of Town-
send's(1980). Such a model would retain the missing-links features and
isolate forces such as exchange rate indeterminacy and the tenuous
character of fiat money equilibria. At the same time, it could accommo-
date more realistic and econometrically plausible infinite-period utility
functions for households, so that one could think more seriously about
formally using the model to interpret time series data. The problem is
that such models quickly become analytically difficult to handle. In
contrast, the Baumol-Tobin model and the real balances in the utility
function models have more readily suggested econometric specifications.
Despite its abstractness and its remoteness from econometric applica-
bility, the Kareken-Wallace model has the virtue of pointing toward
forces that have seemed to operate in international currency markets and
that other models have to some extent ignored. The history of exchange
controls in England since the Second World War, for example, can be
understood, at least partly, as a response to the forces pinpointed by their
model.
1
1 So can the concern that monetary authorities in the United
States and Europe have exhibited about the implications of Eurocurrency
markets for monetary management. There is also Mr. Ortiz's observation
that it was only with considerable difficulty that the Mexican authori-
ties were able to induce Mexican citizens to hold domestically issued
currency.
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